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Abstract
Professors Hathaway and Macklin debate the legality of the 
“presumption of state protection” that the Supreme Court of 
Canada established as a matter of Canadian refugee law 
in the Ward decision. Professor Hathaway argues that this 
presumption should be rejected because it lacks a sound 
empirical basis and because it conflicts with the relatively 
low evidentiary threshold set by the Refugee Convention’s 
“well-founded fear” standard. Professor Macklin contends 
that the Ward presumption does not in and of itself impose 
an unduly onerous burden on claimants, and that much 
of the damage wrought by the presumption comes instead 
from misinterpretation and misapplication of the Supreme 
Court’s dictum by lower courts. 
Résumé
Les professeurs Hathaway et Macklin reconsidèrent la 
légalité de la « présomption de la protection de l’État » 
que La Cour suprême du Canada avait promulgé comme 
principe de droit canadien en matière de réfugiés dans 
le jugement Ward. Le professeur Hathaway soutient que 
cette présomption devrait être rejetée en raison de son 
manque de fondement empirique rigoureux ainsi que 
de son incompatibilité avec le niveau de preuve relative-
ment faible impliqué par la norme de « crainte justifiée » 
établie par la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés. 
La professeure Macklin estime que la présomption Ward 
n’impose guère en soi un fardeau excessivement lourd sur 
les demandeurs, et que la plupart des problèmes engendrés 
par la présomption découlent des erreurs d’interprétation 
ou d’application de la décision de la Cour suprême de la 
part des tribunaux inférieurs. 
More than two decades later, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ward v Canada, [1993] 2 SCR 689 remains one of the world’s most significant 
refugee law decisions. Ward’s holdings on such matters as 
the meaning of both “membership of a particular social 
group” and the relevance of non-state agents of persecu-
tion were groundbreaking and of indisputable value to the 
evolution of refugee protection in Canada and around the 
world. Indeed, Ward made clear the overarching purpose of 
refugee law, which informs nearly every interpretive ques-
tion: “International refugee law was formulated to serve as 
a back-up to protection one expects from the state of which 
an individual is a national. It was meant to come in to play 
only in situations when that protection is unavailable, and 
then only in certain situations. The international commu-
nity intended that persecuted individuals be required to 
approach their home state for protection before the respon-
sibility of other states becomes engaged.”
More controversially, however, the Court addressed the 
question of how best to operationalize the surrogate protec-
tion principle. While in Ward the home country had con-
ceded its inability to protect, the Court nonetheless opined 
about how to proceed in the more usual case where there is 
no such concession: “Clear and convincing confirmation of 
a state’s inability to protect must be provided. For example, 
a claimant might advance testimony of similarly situated 
individuals let down by the state protection arrangement or 
the claimant’s testimony of past personal incidents in which 
state protection did not materialize. Absent some evidence, 
the claim should fail, as nations should be presumed capable 
of protecting their citizens. Security of nationals is, after all, 
the essence of sovereignty. Absent a situation of complete 
breakdown of state apparatus …, it should be assumed that 
the state is capable of protecting a claimant” (emphasis added).
While clearly obiter dicta, this passage has generated real 
controversy. First, courts have struggled with the question 
of whether the adequacy of state protection focuses on the 
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efforts made by the state to protect, or on whether state 
action is effective in reducing the risk of persecution below 
the threshold of “reasonable chance.” Second and more gen-
erally, the basic notion of a “presumption” of state protec-
tion has led lower courts to impose a significant burden on 
persons seeking recognition of refugee status. For example, 
the Federal Court of Appeal in Carrillo v Canada, 2008 FCA 
94, at [30], interpreted Ward as imposing on refugee claim-
ants a burden to “adduce relevant, reliable and convincing 
evidence which satisfies the trier of fact on the balance of 
probabilities that the state protection is inadequate.”
In The Law of Refugee Status1 James Hathaway and 
Michelle Foster argue that the notion that states are “pre-
sumed to protect” their citizens, as suggested in Canada v 
Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, is unsound. In their view the result-
ant duty on refugee claimants to rebut a presumption of state 
protection is at odds with the duty of the applicant to show no 
more than a “well-founded fear” of being persecuted. More 
generally, Hathaway and Foster endorse the view of the Full 
Federal Court of Australia in A. v Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs, (1993) 53 ald 545, at [41] that the 
Ward presumption should be rejected on the grounds that 
there is no basis in principle for importing a presumption 
that lacks a solid empirical foundation. They contend that 
the question of whether a state is unable or unwilling to pro-
vide protection is a simple question of fact that must, like all 
questions of fact, be investigated in line with the shared duty 
of fact-finding. In contrast, Audrey Macklin contends that, 
properly interpreted, the presumption of state protection as 
articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward does 
not require refugee claimants fearing persecution by non-
state actors to rebut a presumption of state protection on a 
balance of probabilities. Rather, the Federal Court of Appeal 
has misconstrued and misapplied the Supreme Court’s dic-
tum on the presumption of state protection.
We reproduce here a recent exchange between Hathaway 
and Macklin on the significance and ramifications of the 
notion of a presumption that states can and will protect 
their citizens. 
Audrey Macklin to James Hathaway, 25 June 2014
1. I disagree with you that the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Ward made a critical mistake in talking about a pre-
sumption that states are able to protect their nationals, 
which it derived as an implication flowing from state 
sovereignty. Contra the Australian Full Federal Court 
in A, not all presumptions require a basic fact. Most 
notably, criminal law presumes sanity without any 
underlying basic fact. The presumption of innocence is 
another, albeit more complicated example. So even if it 
is a presumption without a basic fact, that is not fatal.
2. But more importantly, I think that we do presume 
that states are able and willing to protect their citizens 
(which they do by refraining from persecuting them 
and by protecting them from abuses by others). That 
presumption explains why the burden is on a refugee 
claimant to make out (on a standard of reasonable 
chance/serious risk) the elements of his/her claim 
(well-founded fear of persecution on enumerated 
grounds). It is true that the court didn’t have to say 
anything about it and I am persuaded by your critique 
(not to mention subsequent Federal Court jurispru-
dence) that it definitely would have been better not to 
have said anything. Read in its best light, however, the 
Supreme Court in Ward is saying no more than “It is 
the job of a state to protect its citizens. It’s up to you, 
refugee claimant, to prove that your state won’t do its 
job with respect to you.” I think that the mistake in 
the Federal Court jurisprudence is to double up on 
that burden by adding a separate (and tougher) bur-
den specific to failure of state protection qua discrete 
element in the refugee analysis. 
James Hathaway to Audrey Macklin, 28 June 2014
I’m intrigued by your point about whether a presumption 
needs a factual basis or not. Let me push you a bit on this 
one.
1. The presumption of state protection is actually a 
factual presumption—and in this sense I think it is 
quite different from the presumption of innocence, 
which is really just a means of operationalizing the 
criminal law’s burden of proof. If, as I think must 
be the case, entitlement to refugee status ought to be 
an open-ended inquiry into the merits of the factual 
need for surrogate protection, it seems to me that the 
bar for a “factual presumption” would have to be set 
quite high—something that is usually, perhaps nearly 
always, the case. If that is not so, I can see no reason 
to encumber the refugee with the duty to dislodge the 
presumption rather than simply asking the question.
2. This does not mean, by the way, that I’m not per-
suaded by Ward’s true presumption—in favour of a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted if an absence of 
state protection is shown. I think the empirical case 
is definitely stronger for this than the “states can and 
will protect” presumption, but not so overwhelm-
ingly clear that the question shouldn’t just be asked. 
So while we agree that the “double burden of proof” 
is the most patent manifestation of the problem, it 
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Audrey Macklin to James Hathaway, 29 June 2014
Glad to be pushed on this. The way you framed your 
response helps me see more clearly where and why we differ 
in our route to the same outcome.
1. I think the presumption of state protection (POSP) 
is, like the presumption of innocence (POI), a legal 
and not a factual presumption. Perhaps the Federal 
Court’s mistake can be rephrased as erroneously treat-
ing the presumption of state protection as if it were a 
factual presumption. I assume that we agree that the 
presumption of innocence is a legal (and not factual) 
presumption—after all, about 2/3 of people who are 
charged are convicted. So as factual presumptions 
go, it doesn’t work. I also agree that the main point 
of the POI is to allocate the burden of proof: it is the 
state that must prove that the person committed the 
offence, and not the individual who must prove her 
innocence. There are various sound reasons for allo-
cating the burden that way. And the burden is heavy 
(beyond a reasonable doubt), but for reasons that have 
little to do with the factual likelihood that the accused 
committed the offence.
2. Similarly, I think the POSP is a legal presumption that 
allocates the burden of proof to the claimant to estab-
lish the elements of the refugee claim. We express/jus-
tify it by saying something like this: The international 
state system is predicated on the claim that states are 
able and willing to protect their citizens. That is part 
of the justification for the allocation of sovereignty 
to individual states, etc. And that is also why refugee 
protection is (as you put it) surrogate protection—
meant to address the anomalous situation where the 
state doesn’t actually fulfil its obligations. If it wasn’t 
a departure from the “norm” of state protection, we 
wouldn’t call it surrogate. So we put the burden on the 
one who challenges the norm to show that expected 
protection will not be forthcoming in his case.
3. To the extent that POSP is a legal and not a factual pre-
sumption, it doesn’t tell us anything about how “heavy” 
the burden on the claimant ought to be to make her 
case. And, for a variety of good reasons, courts have 
decided that the standard should be relatively light—
“reasonable chance” or “serious reasons,” rather than 
balance of probabilities or beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. So we say that the states are presumed able/willing to 
protect their citizens (because the international state 
is predicated on it, legal fiction though it may be). That 
means that the burden is on the claimant to make out 
the elements of a refugee claim (well-founded fear of 
persecution on an enumerated ground), according 
to the standard of proof (reasonable chance) that we 
think appropriate. The presumption is not factual, 
and so tells us nothing about how hard it will be to 
dislodge it as an empirical matter in any given case. 
And if the burden is relatively light (in comparison to 
the criminal or civil standard), this is the product of 
many factors. One might be the factual weakness of 
the legal presumption, but I’m not sure about that—
I’d have to think about it more deeply.
5. Now, there is another way of coming at this, which 
you hint at in talking about an “open-ended inquiry.” 
One could imagine a system that did not allocate the 
burden of proof. It would be a purely inquisitorial sys-
tem in which the decision-maker was responsible for 
investigating and determining refugee status. In such 
a system, there would be no need for a legal presump-
tion, because there is no burden to allocate as between 
parties. But that is not the system we have—even 
when interpreted generously to allow for the engaged, 
inquisitorial decision-maker and a non-adversarial 
process. I am not commenting on the desirability of 
such a process, just on whether it exists at present. 
But more significantly, it is not the system that the 
Supreme Court thought we had when it decided Ward. 
It operated on the understanding that one party did 
bear the burden, and that party was the claimant. The 
presumption of state protection, like the presumption 
of innocence, is a device for allocating the burden at 
the outset. It is not pulled out of thin air, but it should 
not be misconstrued as a factual presumption that 
applies to a specific element of the refugee test (exist-
ence of persecution).
6. So, if I thought the presumption was a factual one, 
I think I would agree with you. But I don’t think it 
is. And I think that when the Supreme Court talks 
about clear and convincing evidence, etc., it is only 
imposing an evidentiary burden on the claimant, as 
in “If you are from a country where the state appara-
tus has not broken down (however defined) and you 
don’t show clear and convincing evidence re: lack of 
state protection, you are at risk of a negative inference 
being drawn.” We could have done without it, in my 
view, but I don’t think it is as damaging as the Federal 
Court has made it through its own distortions.
So, if I’ve understood you correctly, our divergence stems 
from a difference of opinion about whether the POSP is best 
understood as a legal or a factual presumption. Does that 
seem right?
James Hathaway to Audrey Macklin, 30 June 2014
1. I think your para. 2 is the nub of the issue. The pre-
sumption of innocence in criminal law serves a helpful 
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function in reinforcing in a practical way the agreed 
legal standard of proof—i.e., proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
2. As your analysis in para. 2 makes very clear, the POSP 
invented by Canadian courts does exactly the oppo-
site: it undermines the legal standard of proof—well-
founded fear, i.e., only a reasonable chance or serious 
possibility—by requiring more of the claimant than 
the Refugee Convention allows. Thus, when you say 
(accurately) that “the POSP is a legal presumption 
that allocates the burden of proof to the claimant to 
establish the elements of the refugee claim,” you are 
right—that’s exactly what it does, and at a high level. 
But that is also precisely why it is untenable as a mat-
ter of international law, since there is a shared duty of 
fact-finding that requires only that at the end of the 
day the evidence adduced meets the well-founded fear 
test. My guess is that this is why other countries don’t 
go down this road (even if they invent equally awful 
mechanisms to avoid their responsibilities).
3. So this brings me back to where I began: if this is being 
treated as a “legal” presumption, it shouldn’t be—that 
standard is well-founded fear. Hence it would only be 
appropriate to have a POSP if it were a “factual” pre-
sumption—which it can’t be, for the reasons we agree 
on.
Are we getting closer?
Audrey Macklin to James Hathaway, 30 June 2014
1. Almost there, I think. I think, however, that you con-
flate two separate questions: (a) who has the burden 
of proof?; and (b) what is required to discharge that 
burden?
2. The first is the legal burden of proof and it is allocated 
to the state in criminal law, and the plaintiff in civil 
cases. The second is the standard of proof and could, 
in principle, be answered in different ways—beyond a 
reasonable doubt, on a balance of probabilities, what-
ever. After all, we allocate the burden of proof to the 
plaintiff in civil cases, but the standard is only balance 
of probabilities; in criminal law, we allocate the bur-
den to the state, and the standard is higher. But if the 
state is suing someone in civil court for a tort action, 
the standard is balance of probabilities. So, knowing 
where the legal burden lies does not answer what the 
standard of proof is. What we have in refugee law (on 
the best reading of Ward) is a legal burden on the 
claimant, on a standard of proof that is “reasonable 
chance” or “serious possibility.”
3. I’m not sure if we are struggling with semantic murki-
ness, but my sense is that you want to endorse what I 
described in paragraph 5 in my previous email: there 
can be no legal burden of proof in a refugee claim. The 
decision-maker is conducting an inquiry more than 
an adjudication, and so the concept of burden of proof 
is simply inapposite.
So I think this is where we come down so far:
1. We agree that the POSP purports to be a legal burden of 
proof. I think it’s legally permissible (and inevitable in 
practice, but that’s another story) to put a legal burden 
on the claimant. You do not.
2. I think that the POSP puts the legal burden on a claim-
ant to make out a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted on a standard of proof of reasonable chance 
or serious possibility. You think that once the legal 
burden is on the claimant, a higher standard of proof 
necessarily follows, which cannot be reconciled with 
“reasonable chance” or “serious possibility.” I think 
that is mistaken, and this mistake gives rise to the 
incoherent approach (not yours, the Federal Court’s) 
of asking whether a claimant has shown on a balance 
of probabilities that there is a reasonable chance of 
persecution.
3. You think that if POSP cannot lawfully operate as a 
legal presumption, it must be a factual presumption. 
Factual presumptions are valid in principle, depend-
ing on the rationality of the inference from basic fact 
to presumed fact. But POSP fails as a factual presump-
tion. If I accepted that POSPis a factual presumption, I 
would agree with you that it fails.
4. I also think that even if it was accepted as a factual 
presumption, it could lawfully require no more of 
a claimant than that she point to evidence that, if 
accepted, could show that the level of state protection 
still left a reasonable chance of persecution in her case. 
That is how an evidentiary burden works and I think 
this is what Ward says (on its best reading). Not sure 
where you are on this point.
5. To add to your real world skepticism about what other 
countries do/don’t do, it is perhaps noteworthy that 
Maldonado, [1980] 2 FC 302 says that sworn evidence 
is presumed true. So, if taken seriously, that would 
go a long way to alleviating the concern that a legal 
burden on a claimant is unduly onerous, since sworn 
testimony is the main evidence in any case. Of course, 
Maldonado is honoured in the breach, just as other 
countries without a legal burden of proof on claimants 
find ways to reject claims anyway.
I really think our disagreement is about whether it is per-
missible to put a legal burden of proof on a claimant, and 
whether that necessarily dictates what I call the standard 
of proof. You say no/yes and I say yes/no. I’m drawing on 
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my understanding of how burdens work in criminal law 
(although I’ve not taught it in a long time).
I should say that I quite enjoy trying to work out this 
point, and I also suspect that we are the only people in the 
world who would find it interesting.
James Hathaway to Audrey Macklin, 30 June 2014
1. If by “legal burden of proof” you mean who has the 
burden of production, then by and large—though sub-
ject to the shared duty of fact-finding!—I can agree 
that this lies with the person seeking recognition of 
status. But a legal burden of proof should not in my 
view be given any greater substantive role than this, 
since there is ultimately only one evidentiary question 
in refugee status assessment and that is defined by the 
“well-founded fear” standard—nothing more, nothing 
less.
2. Assuming we’re now both speaking about the quan-
titative question (how much evidence is enough?), 
then I think that a “presumption” of state protection 
means that the applicant can in practice only succeed 
by showing more than the well-founded fear standard 
requires. For example, in Cardoza Fonseca, (1987) 480 
US 421, the US Supreme Court rejected the view that 
anything approaching balance of probabilities was 
required. Yet how do you overcome a presumption 
with only evidence of a 10% risk? Any reference to 
having to show anything on a balance of probabilities, 
much less to rebut a presumption, seems almost inevi-
tably to drive us to something beyond that standard (a 
concern that seems clearly borne out in the Canadian 
Federal Court caselaw).
3. We agree that factual presumptions are valid in prin-
ciple, depending on the rationality of the inference 
from basic fact to presumed fact and that POSP fails 
as a factual presumption. To me the Supreme Court’s 
test is clearly an (unwarranted) factual presumption.
4. I agree that a reading of Ward along the lines of what 
you posit would help to alleviate the problem—but 
this does not seem remotely what the Federal Court 
understands it to mean. And perhaps I have a bit more 
sympathy for the unhappy approach of the lower 
courts and tribunals because I think that the Supreme 
Court of Canada unnecessarily complicated things by 
referencing a presumption when simply leaving it as a 
neutral question of fact would have been better.
I’m wondering if our difference comes from the fact that 
you say that you’re approaching this from a criminal law 
point of view, whereas I am not. I don’t really understand 
why you would want to anchor your thinking in such a 
different body of law, given the quite explicit rejection of 
traditional evidentiary standards (criminal or civil) by the 
decision to adopt the “well-founded fear” standard—sui 
generis to refugee law. Is this at the root of our contrasting 
points of view?
Audrey Macklin to James Hathaway, 30 June 2014
1. I think your point about the tendency to require more 
than “reasonable chance” to discharge a legal “pre-
sumption” is interesting and I need to think about it 
more. I’m not immediately persuaded that the label 
“presumption” must require more than a reasonable 
chance to qualify as a presumption, but you may be on 
to something as a pragmatic prediction of how “pre-
sumption” gets used in practice. What follows from 
that, I’m not sure, but either way it warrants more 
thought.
2. My reliance on criminal law is only this: my termi-
nology distinguishes burden of proof from standard 
of proof, and legal burden from evidentiary burden, 
in the same way that Canadian law (both criminal 
and civil) does. And I operate from the proposition 
accepted in Canadian law that the imposition of an 
evidentiary burden doesn’t change the legal burden of 
proof. I just want to be sure that when you and I use 
these terms, we ascribe the same meaning to them. I 
had the feeling we might be invoking the same terms 
but giving them different meanings. I certainly agree 
with you that the actual standard of proof in refugee 
law is sui generis, or at least distinct from the civil/
criminal standards of proof. As you may know, the 
legal burden of proof under the Canadian Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Act for inadmissibility 
is on the government, yet the standard of proof is 
notably lower than balance of probabilities (“reason-
able grounds to believe”)—and it only operates to the 
disadvantage of non-citizens.
Note
 1 James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee 
Status, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
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